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FAMILY LAW – TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 
Summary 
The Court considered whether an objection to the admission of an entire set of documents 
as hearsay preserved the issue for appeal. Second, the Court considered what burden of proof 
should be used to rebut the parental-fault and child’s-best-interest presumptions found in NEV. 
REV. STAT. § 128.109. Finally, the Court considered if substantial evidence supported the 
decision to terminate parental rights and if the district court had considered all required factors. 
Disposition/Outcome 
 Records filed with one division of a court for one proceeding are not automatically part 
of the record in a different division for a different proceeding. Such records may be objected to 
as hearsay. However, a hearsay objection must be made to specific portions rather than an entire 
file. Therefore, the objections to the entire juvenile file in this case were improper and effectively 
waived. 
 The burden of proof to rebut the parental-fault and child’s-best-interest presumptions 
found in NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.109 is a preponderance of the evidence. The family division of 
the district court did  consider all necessary factors in its decision to terminate parental rights 
even though the court did not explicitly list the factors in its opinion. The district court’s decision 
was supported by substantial evidence.   
Factual and Procedural History 
 Quiana, the first appellant, is the mother of the six minor children in question, and 
Arthur, the second appellant, is the father of five of those children. In May 2007, Quiana was 
arrested and charged with child abuse, and later pled no contest. At the time of her arrest, Arthur 
was in prison. The Department of Family Services (DFS) placed the children with Quiana’s 
mother while developing a case plan to reunify Quiana with her children. 
 Quiana’s difficulties following the case plan included not providing proof of 
employment, not showing an adequate home, not completing her counseling sessions, and 
visiting her children only sporadically. Due to these difficulties, DFS filed a petition to terminate 
parental rights in August 2009. After the filing, Arthur choked Quiana in front of the children 
and pled guilty to domestic violence charges. 
 Since the children had been removed from their home for fourteen of the last twenty 
months, the family division of the district court found presumptions that the parents had 
“demonstrated only token efforts to care for the child[ren],” and that it would be in the best 
                                                 
1
 By Timothy A Wiseman. 
interests of the children to terminate the parental rights.
2
 Since Quiana and Arthur had not 
substantially followed the reunification plan, it also found evidence of “failure of parental 
adjustment.”3 The juvenile court record was admitted in its entirety despite an objection that it 
contained hearsay. The objection did not specify which portions constituted hearsay. The family 
division of the district court found that Quiana and Arthur failed to rebut the presumptions, that 
parental fault existed, and that it was in the children’s best interests to terminate parental rights. 
Quiana and Arthur appealed. 
Discussion 
I. A hearsay objection can be effective even when the document is part of the 
record of a division of a court in a different proceeding, but it must be specific 
both as to the grounds of objection and to the particular portion of the 
document. 
DFS argued that the juvenile court record was not subject to hearsay objections because it 
was already part of the records for the family division of the district court. However, these 
records were formed with the juvenile division of the district court as part of a separate 
proceeding. They did not form part of the records for the family division of the district court in 
this proceeding and were subject to objections for hearsay.
4
 
Although these records were vulnerable to objections for hearsay, the objection needed to be 
specific as to both the grounds and the specific portions of the document for which the objection 
was offered.
5
 Since this objection was not specific, it was waived on appeal.  
II. The burden of proof used in rebutting presumptions found in Nev. Rev. Stat. § 
128.109 is a preponderance of the evidence. 
Although Nev. Rev. Stat. § 128.109 does not specify the burden of proof that is to be used in 
rebutting presumptions raised under it, termination of parental rights cases are generally civil 
proceedings.
6
 In civil matters, a presumption can generally be rebutted by a preponderance of the 
evidence.
7
 The Court contrasts this with the burden of clear and convincing evidence that is 
placed on the petitioner seeking termination of parental rights, and points out that the language of 
the statute places this burden on the petitioner only. The Court also highlights that placing this 
                                                 
2
 NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.109 (2007). 
3
 Id. 
4
 In making this ruling, the Court distinguished this case factually from Matter of Parental Rights as to N.D.O, 121 
Nev. 379, 115 P.3d 223 (2005). 
5
 GEORGE E. DIX. ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §52 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6
th
 ed. 2006). 
6
 NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.090(2) (2007). 
7
 Id. § 47.180(1). 
heightened burden on the petitioner helps protect the parents’ right to raise their children and is 
consistent with the position adopted by some other states.
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III. The family division of the district court considered all necessary factors and 
supported its order terminating parental rights with substantial evidence. 
Statute outlines certain factors that must be considered in a termination of parental rights case 
when the child is not in the parents’ custody and when certain presumptions lay the burden to 
present evidence regarding these factors on the parent.
9
 In this case, the family division of the 
district court concluded that some presumptions applied, that Quiana and Arthur had failed to 
overcome the presumptions, and that there was parental fault. It further expressed concern about 
whether Quiana had addressed the problems that led to her whipping two of her children and 
concerns that she did not genuinely participate in initial counseling sessions. It also concluded 
that neither Quiana nor Arthur were prepared to receive custody. The record on appeal 
substantially supported all of these findings and showed that all necessary factors were 
considered even though the order did not explicitly list them.   
Conclusion 
 The Court determined that the hearsay argument regarding the juvenile record had not 
been sufficiently specific and could not be sustained. The Court further clarified that when a 
presumption is shown under NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.109 against a parent that it can be rebutted 
by a preponderance of the evidence. Finally, the Court found that the family division of the 
district court had considered all necessary and appropriate factors in reaching its decision and 
had supported its decision with substantial evidence. Therefore, the Court affirmed the decision 
terminating parental rights. 
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